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Abstract. This article analyzes the recent Israeli military withdrawal from southern Lebanon in the 
context of the efficacy of terrorism in the 21st century. 
 
Many Israelis would claim that Hezbollah is and has been a political group, a political group dedicated to 
driving Israel out of Southern Lebanon, and a political group that has employed terrorism to drive Israel 
out. Many Israelis would go further and claim that Hezbollah is also dedicated to destroying the Israeli 
state by any means necessary--including terrorism. Thus, Hezbollah may still remain a terrorist threat to 
the Israeli people. 
 
One aspect of worrying about future terrorism is whether past terrorism has been successful. So, has it 
in the case of Hezbollah terrorism targeting Israel? An easy answer is yes it has. Hezbollah publicly 
declared that it would continue its attacks against Israel until the latter withdrew from southern 
Lebanon. And the latter did withdraw. 
 
From Hezbollah's publicly stated viewpoint, the attacks induced the withdrawal. And the Hezbollah rank 
and file, leadership, and state and non-state sponsors may believe in this public view. But there is 
another view point. Many foreign policy experts claim that the Israeli government withdrew because it 
finally arrived at the realization that occupying southern Lebanon was no longer in its interests--as 
defined by some combination of strategic, ethical/moral, and domestic political considerations. To this 
viewpoint, Hezbollah terrorist acts were irrelevant, redundant, and even self-defeating to the goal of 
Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. 
 
Although splitting the difference often yields muddled or simplistic assessments, clarity and complexity 
seem to apply to splitting differences in the case at hand. Specifically, another viewpoint is that 
Hezbollah unwittingly helped Israel reach the correct viewpoint that occupation was not in Israeli 
interests. Certainly, one can posit that the Israeli occupation could easily be construed as incompatible 
with Israeli professed ethical and moral interests, as divisive in its domestic politics, and of questionable 
strategic benefit--militarily, economically, socioculturally, and so on. Yet a decision for occupation had 
been made and once made and effected took on a life of its own and significant resistance and inertia to 
moving from some status quo. Given that Hezbollah terrorism induced an ending to the occupation 
policy, one can assert that terrorism achieved a political objective that was positive for the target and 
perpetrator. (The positive in the latter case seems to comprise the political clout that Hezbollah now 
may have in Lebanon, even as the withdrawal leaves some tactical and strategic difficulties for leaders in 
Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and, yes, of Hezbollah.) 
 
The lesson learned for other enemies of Israel may, then, be a bittersweet one. Yes, terrorism can 
achieve a political objective, a change in behavior of an adversary. But one must be careful about what 
one desires, because a terrorist success may concurrently beget a terrorist failure. (See Byman, D. 
(1998). The logic of ethnic terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21, 149-169; Hutchinson, M.C. 
(1972). The concept of revolutionary terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16, 383-396; Merari, A., & 
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Friedland, N. (1985). Social psychological aspects of political terrorism. Applied Social Psychology 
Annual, 6, 185-205; Saper, B. (1988). On learning terrorism. Terrorism, 11, 13-27; Telhami, S. (May 30, 
2000). Does terrorism work? The New York Times, p. A27.) (Keywords: Hezbollah, Israel, Terrorism.) 
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